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Objective: To illuminate the key components of multi-sector reform to address the 
obesogenic environment in New York City during the administration of Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg from 2002 to 2013, we conducted a case study consisting of interviews with 
and a critical analysis of the experiences of leading decision makers and implementers.
Method: Key informant interviews (N = 41) conducted in 2014 were recorded, tran-
scribed, coded, and thematically analyzed. Participants included officials from the Health 
Department and other New York City Government agencies, academics, civil society 
members, and private sector executives.
results: Participants described Mayor Bloomberg as a data-driven politician who wanted 
to improve the lives of New Yorkers. He appointed talented Commissioners and encour-
aged them and their staff to be bold, innovative, and collaborative. Multiple programs 
spanning multiple sectors, with varied approaches and targets, were supported. This 
study found that much of the work relied on loose coalitions across City Government, with 
single agencies responsible for their own agendas, some with health co-benefits. Many 
policies were implemented through non-legislative mechanisms such as executive orders 
and the Health Code. Despite support from academic and some civil society groups, 
strong lobbying from industry and an unfavorable media led to some reforms being mod-
ified, legally challenged or blocked completely, particularly food environment modifiers. 
In contrast, reforms of the physical environment were described as highly consultative 
across and outside government and resulted in slower but more sustained reform.
conclusion: The Bloomberg administration was a “window of opportunity” with the 
imprimatur of the executive to progress a long-term, multi-faceted obesity prevention 
strategy, which has successfully reversed childhood trends. Through the involvement 
of external researchers and the extensive use of empirical data from a wide range of 
participants, this study offers a unique insight into the ways in which this was achieved. 
While some of the aspects of the reforms in New York City are unique to that setting at 
that time, there are important lessons that are transferable to other urban settings. These 
include: strong and consistent leadership; a commitment to innovative approaches and 
cross-sectoral collaboration; and a context to support and encourage this approach.
Keywords: public policy, organizational innovation, environment design, active living, active design, food 
environment, regulation, leadership
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inTrODUcTiOn
Obesity is a complex public health problem requiring multi-pronged 
strategies to reverse long-term trends in rising global prevalence 
(1, 2). Governments have a role in developing and implementing 
policies and programs to address obesity, and this requires differ-
ent agencies within government to act together (3).
During the Mayoral administration of Michael Bloomberg 
(2002–2013), New York City led the way globally in innovative, 
cross-sectoral policy interventions in obesity prevention. The 
wide-ranging reforms aimed to influence the food and the built 
environment to encourage lower caloric intake and more active 
lifestyles are outlined in Table 1. In general terms, the proposed 
reforms included those which provided incentives to industry or 
individuals, taxation and regulation, with a particular emphasis 
on the latter. Trans-unsaturated fatty acids (also known as par-
tially hydrogenated oils or trans fats) were banned (4), calorie 
labeling was mandated at the point of sale (4), nutrition standards 
were mandated in City-run institutions (5), and a regulation limi-
tation on the size of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB; otherwise 
known as the “soda cap” or “portion cap”) was also proposed 
but eventually defeated in the courts (7). A tax on SSB was also 
proposed, but never enacted, through the New York State leg-
islature (8). Incentives were provided to support diversification 
of the food supply in poor neighborhoods through supermarket 
construction (the FRESH initiative) and via mobile food carts, 
which offer only fresh produce (so called “green carts”) (9, 10). 
In the built environment, infrastructure provision and renewal 
acted to create incentives for active lifestyles, including the roll-
out of integrated streets, cycle paths, a bike share program, and 
park facilities (11, 12). The use of the Active Design Guidelines, 
incorporating healthy concepts into design elements of both the 
internal and external built environment, has been mandated for 
use in major projects throughout the City (13).
Several papers have been published which outline the key ele-
ments and early achievements of the reforms (4, 5, 9, 11, 14, 19, 
31–34). Less has been written about the way in which the reforms 
were successfully introduced or how these were perceived in 
the administration, the staff of various agencies across the City 
Government, by private industry, and by civil society (13, 14, 25, 
33–37).
This paper does not aim to provide an analysis of all the indi-
vidual policies and programs that occurred under the Bloomberg 
administration. Rather, it examines the experiences of many of 
the key decision makers and others involved in undertaking 
this work in New York City to illuminate the key components 
required to introduce and sustain whole of government reforms 
to address an obesogenic environment. While the paper is largely 
descriptive in nature, it will reflect on these experiences in the 
light of two theoretical frameworks relating to public policy (38) 
and public administration (39, 40).
aims and research Questions
The study aimed to gain further understanding of the complex 
nature of cross-sectoral collaboration to achieve solutions for 
“wicked problems” such as obesity so as to assist public health 
practitioners in other settings to do likewise.
The specific research questions were:
 1. What are the barriers and enablers to introducing and sustain-
ing whole of government reforms to address the obesogenic 
environment?
 2. How can public perceptions of the value of such reforms be 
assessed and/or influenced in relation to such reforms?
 3. What does “success” look like? In particular, how can upstream 
changes best be measured to demonstrate early progress that 
could point to longer-term success?
Theoretical Framework
Two theoretical frameworks informed this study. The first was 
Kingdon’s multiple streams theory of public policy, based on a 
series of interviews with people associated with the US Federal 
Government, is now over 30 years old, but remains useful when 
considering public health policy (38). Kingdon argues that three 
largely independent processes or “streams” operate in the public 
policy realm: the political environment, the identification and 
prioritization of problems, and the formulation of potential policy 
solutions to those problems. This theory proposes that the key to 
successful policy implementation is when all three streams inter-
sect, usually for a brief period which he refers to as a “window of 
opportunity,” to allow problems to emerge, solutions to be recog-
nized and for these to be politically supported. Kingdon further 
argues that key differences between the policy and the political 
realm include the varied pace of development, the dominant 
actors, and the way in which priorities and solutions are agreed 
upon. In politics, often unpredictable and rapid changes can 
lead to problem identification while potential solutions are often 
formulated by negotiation, which takes into account conflicting 
interests or by taking advantage of an often fleeting commonality 
of interests. Policy on the other hand, tends to be the realm of 
technical experts, is developed incrementally and relies on the 
diffusion of ideas and the gathering and testing of evidence. 
“Windows of opportunity” occur when varied interests coincide 
or certain events occur, which may include the political process 
itself (e.g., an election) or external incidents (e.g., media interest). 
The role of what Kingdon refers to as “policy entrepreneurs” is to 
recognize the intersection of the streams and thereby grasp these 
“windows of opportunity” to advance the policy agenda.
Moore has written extensively on the changing role of public 
service administrators and has argued that this role should not 
be restricted to legislative and regulatory functions nor to service 
delivery but rather to have a leadership role in creating what he 
has termed “public value” (39). His “strategic triangle” explains 
how the interaction of the authorizing environment, operational 
capacity, and public value can frame the work of public admin-
istration. The authorizing environment is what gives public 
officials the authority to act. While this is primarily the political 
authority that comes from elected officials and ultimately the 
electorate, it may also include legal authority and the legitimacy 
that comes from the support of individuals or organizations 
in the non-government sector. Operational capacity refers to 
the ability to perform the duties which are required to achieve 
certain objectives and these include financial resources, technical 
TaBle 1 | Main legislative and regulatory reforms to support obesity prevention, new York city, 2002–2013.
Policy 
framework
setting intervention Method Year successfully 
introduced or enacted
reference
Food 
environment
Farmers’ markets Supplement to SNAP. $2 coupons for each $5 
spent at farmers’ markets
Waiver request to 
USDA
2006 Yes (14)
Fast food restaurants Trans fat ban Health code 2007 Yes (4)
NYC facilities All food purchased and served by city, including 
in schools, to meet nutrition standards
Executive order 2008 Yes (8)
Chain food service 
establishments
Calorie labeling Health code 2008 Yes (4)
Street vendors (green 
carts)
New mobile food permits that only vend fresh 
fruit and vegetables in precincts with low 
consumption rates and lack of access
City council 2008 Yes (9)
Supermarkets Zoning and tax incentives for supermarket 
creation and expansion (FRESH: Food Retail 
Expansion to Support Health)
Zoning text 
amendment and tax 
policies/city council
2009 Yes (10, 15)
Commercial buildings Water bottle refilling stations Plumbing code/city 
council
2009 Yes (16)
NYC schools More stringent healthy food and beverage 
requirements than the 2008 executive order
NYC DOE chancellor 
regulation
2009 Yes, but modified by city 
council
(11, 17, 18)
Commercial beverage 
industry
Sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax NY state legislature 
(proposed by State, 
supported by NYC)
2009 and 2010 No (proposed but not 
voted on as part of 2009 
or 2010 budgets)
(8)
SNAP vendors Restrict use of SNAP benefits on SSB Waiver request to 
USDA
2010 No (denied by USDA 
after hunger advocate/
industry opposition)
(6)
NYC schools Water fountains Federal law (healthy 
hunger free act)
2010 Yes (19)
New York City Mandated annual report on nutrition 
environment
City council 2011 Yes (20)
Food service 
establishments 
regulated by DOHMH
Portion cap on SSB Health code 2012 Yes, but overturned by 
courts
(7, 21)
NYC licensed 
children’s camps
Nutrition guidelines, including guidelines on 
beverages served
Health code 2012 Yes (22)
Physical 
environment
Cycling infrastructure Cycle path expansion – on-road protected bike 
lanes and greenways
DOT program 
expansion
2007 Yes (11)
Cycling infrastructure Street bicycle parking DOT program 
expansion
2007 Yes (11)
Cycling infrastructure Mandated indoor bicycle parking in new 
commercial and residential buildings; mandated 
entry into existing buildings with freight elevators
Zoning text 
amendment/city 
council
2009 Yes (11, 23)
Streets DOT Street Design Manual for “complete 
streets”
DOT guideline for 
project approvals
2009 Yes (24)
Cycling infrastructure Bicycle share program (citi-bike) DOT-initiated PPP 2013 Yes (12)
NYC sponsored 
building projects 
Routine use of Active Design Guidelines,a Street 
Design Manual and LEED Pilot Credit “Design 
for Active Occupants”b for new and major 
renovation design and construction projects
Executive order 2013 Yes (12, 13, 
25–29)
NYC owned and 
leased buildings
Routine stairway access and use of stair prompt 
signage to promote stair use
Executive order 2013  Yes (29)
All buildings Hold open device bill to facilitate stair visibility 
and use
City councilc 2014 Yes  (30)
All new buildings/
major renovations
Public access stairway and stair prompt signage 
posting to facilitate stair use
City councilc 2014 In committee  (30)
Food and 
physical 
environment
NYC permitted 
childcare centers
Nutrition, physical activity and screen time 
requirements
Health code 2007 Yes (19)
aActive Design Guidelines include a range of interventions in the outdoor and indoor physical environment to promote physical activity.
bLeadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) green building rating system now has a pilot credit “Design for Active Occupants” created by NYC.
cTwo bills introduced during Bloomberg administration, reintroduced in 2014 – one passed in 2014 and second bill pending.
NYC, City of New York; PPP, public–private partnership; SES, socio-economic status; SNAP, supplemental nutrition assistance program; SSB, sugar-sweetened beverages.
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TaBle 2 | sample characteristics.
interviews Participants
New York City government DOHMH 7 8
DPHO 3 5
Other 7 10
Non-government Health 4 4
Non-health 2 2
Other Academic 7 8
Political 1 2
Private sector 2 2
Total 33 41
DOHMH, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; DPHO, District Public Health 
Office; Private sector, design and construction industry.
abilities, and people. Importantly, this concept is distinct from 
organizational capacity, and therefore includes the concepts of 
coproduction with partners inside or outside of government to 
achieve cobenefits. Public value describes both a process and an 
outcome and summarizes two distinct but related concepts. First, 
it refers to what the public thinks is being done by the public 
sector, and what in turn is their opinion on that performance. 
In short, their determination of whether the outcome is one that 
they desire and value. Second, the public’s appreciation that what 
is being done is something which is of inherent value in an uncer-
tain future. This is particularly relevant to complex problems like 
the population health consequences of obesity, which will require 
sustained effort to remedy. In the discourse around the concept 
of public value, one of the important areas of debate is about who 
can and who should be deciding what is of value, and what role 
if any should non-elected public officials have in determining 
or even influencing these matters in a democratic system (40). 
These contested spaces highlight the crucial role of measurement 
of problems and their solutions to demonstrate the scale of the 
issue, what is being done and any change on the matter being 
addressed and to monitor public opinion of those government 
actions. Similar to Kingdon’s intersecting streams, strategies to 
create public value require the alignment of a convincing value 
proposition, sufficient and sustained political authorization, and 
operational feasibility (40).
MaTerials anD MeThODs
A case study methodology was employed which had two compo-
nents: interviews with key informants and an extensive document 
review. The study protocol was developed in consultation with 
staff at New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
(DOHMH or Health Department).
Key informants, here termed participants, were purposively 
selected to gather information from those involved in obesity 
prevention and related activities during the Bloomberg admin-
istration. The aim was to include actors from both the health 
and non-health sectors, from within and outside of government 
and with a range of professional backgrounds and roles. All 
key informants were based in New York City. An initial list of 
20 names was generated by DOHMH and then approached by 
the research team. A snowballing technique was used to identify 
additional potential participants.
The semi-structured interviews were guided by a list of sug-
gested questions (see Supplementary Material). All interviews 
were conducted face-to-face by the lead investigator (PK). The 
key domains explored in the interviews were based on our a priori 
hypotheses and on the theoretical framework: the factors which 
motivated participant involvement, the role of leadership and 
governance in enabling policy reform, the assessment of public 
opinion of those reforms, the prospects for sustainability of the 
reforms, and perceptions of and ability to measure success of 
the reform agenda. Interviews were recorded and transcriptions 
were provided to participants to confirm accuracy. All data were 
de-identified and collated so that only general themes that emerge 
from the interviews are reported. Where quotes of participants 
have been used in the text, some minor editing has occurred to 
assist the reader to understand the context and in some cases to 
maintain confidentiality. The addition or substitution of words is 
indicated by the use of square brackets. Words or sentences that 
have been deleted from the quotes are indicated by the use of 
ellipses. Quotes have been rechecked by participants for accuracy 
and de-identified. Minor amendments to a small number of 
quotes were made by some participants to improve the clarity or 
grammar (41).
An iterative, cumulative process has been applied with regular 
reflections on the data collected. An initial list of descriptive themes 
was developed by PK based on the review of notes taken during 
the interviews. De-identified interview data were then coded by 
AD using the qualitative software ATLAS.ti version 7 (Scientific 
Software Development GmbH, Berlin, Germany, 2013). Inductive 
qualitative content analysis has been used to analyze the data 
that was then coded to reflect the themes that emerged from the 
interviews. Responses by multiple interviewees with their varied 
perspectives across and outside City Government and in different 
positions of power within their organizations were compared in 
the analysis of the transcripts of interview. In addition, interview 
data were triangulated with key documents including reports and 
other published materials as well as web-recordings of seminars 
and radio and print media interviews with key decision makers. 
These materials were reviewed by the principal investigator 
(PK) before, during, and after the interview phase to check the 
interpretation of findings and to see how closely the participant 
experience aligned with the public discourse of the period. What 
emerged was a more nuanced narrative and this is presented in 
the Section “Discussion.”
Ethical clearance was sought but deemed exempt by both the 
New York City DOHMH Institutional Review Board and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Health Human Research 
Ethics Committee. Despite this, written informed consent was 
still obtained from each participant.
resUlTs
Interviews were conducted in New York City from August to 
October 2014. Thirty-three face-to-face interviews were con-
ducted with between one and four interviewees in attendance. 
This resulted in a total of 41 participants (Table 2) and almost 
30 h of recorded material. The majority of the interviews (29/33, 
88%) were with single participants. For the group interviews, 
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two groups comprised of two participants, one of three and 
one of four. Answers to questions were regarded as individual 
responses and recorded and analyzed separately. There was only 
one interview where the identified key informant was adminis-
tratively “outranked” by another person in the room, which may 
have influenced the responses given in this interview. Of those 
approached, one potential interviewee declined to be interviewed 
and two others were unavailable during the study period. There 
were no withdrawals from the study.
The resulting sample included participants from a wide range 
of sectors including 23 City Government officials (13 from health 
and the others from the departments of transport, design and con-
struction, planning and parks), 8 academics, 6 employees of non-
government organizations (NGO), two private-sector executives, 
a politician, and a political advisor. Several key decision makers 
and/or implementers of obesity prevention-related policies and 
programs were included. All interviewees, including NGOs and 
academics were either based in New York City or substantial 
components of their work were in New York City (two had offices 
in neighboring counties). The NGO employees were senior staff 
members of those organizations who were specifically and inti-
mately involved with the work described. There were no lobbyists 
included in the sample. Several participants had moved to other 
positions, roles or sectors by the time of interview so their narra-
tives quoted do not always apply to their job at time of interview, 
but rather to their role during the Bloomberg Administration.
While some new topics continued to emerge during inter-
views, saturation was reached on the major domains outlined 
in the interview schedule. The main theme that emerged from 
the data was the crucial leadership role which political and other 
influential actors had in encouraging or establishing, then foster-
ing and building collaborative partnerships to achieve and sustain 
a public health agenda. Within this theme, there were several 
important enabling factors identified, including: a sophisticated 
understanding of obesity, its determinants and ways in which 
these could be influenced; a willingness to be bold and innova-
tive; a willingness to collaborate; and a context which supported 
collaborative action and provided mechanisms for the adoption 
of innovative solutions.
leadership – Bold, innovative, and  
Data Driven
All participants agreed that the authorizing environment for 
reform was strong. Perceptions on leadership of the obesity 
prevention effort during the Bloomberg administration varied, 
largely dependent on two factors. These were the role and position 
of the participant, and the participant’s opinion on the primacy of 
political commitment and authority versus bureaucratic leader-
ship. In food environment reform, the encouragement to take on 
big health issues came from the Mayor, the thematic direction 
came from his two Health Commissioners, and the specific 
programmatic leaders were within the DOHMH. The Mayor was 
also a strong advocate of reform in the physical activity environ-
ment, but the other leadership roles were more dispersed, with 
important coordination work within the DOHMH together with 
prominent direction from other Commissioners and their staff as 
well as important contributions from the private sector.
There was universal agreement that Mayor Bloomberg was 
a “public health Mayor” and showed great commitment to 
improving the lives of New Yorkers. He was open to bold ideas 
to accomplish this.
Clearly Bloomberg knew public health; he had endowed 
a public health school at this point …  I think he was 
really willing to push on this from a policy perspec-
tive … more than any other government official had. 
(Academic 1)
Essentially he “appointed smart Commissioners [Department 
Heads] and got out of their way” (Academic 2, ex-DOHMH) and 
supported their “bold ideas” in the public sphere when required. 
One participant suggested that he operated by “pushing some 
things through” to achieve his aims, and then being prepared to 
“take the heat” where these proved to be unpopular or controver-
sial. As one participant described:
He wanted to do the big things and help out the peo-
ple of the city of New York and he wasn’t using it as 
a stepping-stone for anything else and he didn’t have 
any other motives … So, if he saw something that he 
really believed was going to be good for New Yorkers 
and health was a damn important measure then he 
was going to do it because he felt that was what he got 
elected to do. (Academic 2)
Participants felt that he was able to be brave as he was not 
beholden to political donors, and lacked any further political 
ambitions. As one interviewee put it,
He came in as a multi-billionaire who could have done 
whatever he wanted, or [done] nothing (Academic 2)
He understood the complex data illustrating the issues and 
was guided by this in determining which policies he would 
support.
He wanted to see the data, he was big on data, he 
wanted to see the evidence …  and if he believed 
that it would [work] he would be willing to sup-
port and he was really steadfast in his support of 
it. Notwithstanding the fact that it was particularly 
unpopular. (New York City Government [NYC Gov.], 
Health 1)
Mayor Bloomberg was prepared to use his executive powers 
to enact reforms to support the public health agenda (Table 1). 
Executive orders included mandating changed nutrition stand-
ards for food purchased by the City and the routine use of the 
Active Design Guidelines and related manuals for new and major 
renovation construction projects. Not all participants agreed 
with the Bloomberg approach to implementing initiatives, and 
voiced similar views to common critiques of his administration 
as being “top-down” and unresponsive to community perceptions 
particularly in poor neighborhoods.
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I think the lack of community engagement is definitely 
a fair one. I think he was like: “well, here’s the data, don’t 
you get it?” (NYC Gov., Health 2)
[Bloomberg] didn’t engage the community or the larger 
city as a whole. He did dictate from on high (Academic 1)
This criticism of Bloomberg was not universally applicable, 
with participants also providing examples of substantial input 
from professional groups and civil society in the formulation 
and the implementation of some of the reforms, notably those 
associated with the Active Design Guidelines (26).
  …  the [Fit] City Conferences [were] a platform 
that was created for public health professionals and 
design professionals to come together to have a dia-
logue … there were a whole series of workshops where 
design professionals were contributing ideas. That was 
a big part of working with our local American Institute 
of Architecture, so it was not just City Government, but 
included professional organizations and academics to 
diversify the dialogue. While it primarily involved pro-
fessionals within the field at the very outset of the pro-
ject, the Active [Design] Guidelines ultimately became 
a resource to help facilitate community outreach and to 
help provide community groups with a series of tools 
and strategies to advocate for healthy neighborhoods 
and cities. (NYC Gov., non-health 1)
Others suggested that this “benign dictatorship” (NYC Gov., 
Health 3) approach contributed to rapid implementation of 
Bloomberg’s broad reform agenda.
Could he have done a lot of things that he did if he did 
do it in that community oriented approach I think is an 
open question. (Academic 1)
In addition to Bloomberg, there were other leaders recognized 
by the participants, reflecting an element of distributed leader-
ship in the reform agenda. This included the Commissioners 
(Department Heads appointed by the Mayor) during this period, 
including the two Health and the Design and Construction 
Commissioners, a number of specific directors working under 
the Commissioners, the Deputy Mayor, Mayoral staff, and some 
members of the City Council. As one participant explained:
[The Department of Design and Construction 
Commissioner] obviously had a huge amount of 
authority, which allowed us to proceed … and a huge 
capital works program here that made it meaningful 
and gave us traction. (NYC Gov., non-health 2)
Other leaders were key implementers in the bureaucracy from 
a range of agencies across the City Government. In this respect, 
leadership was about fostering and maintaining partnerships to 
expand upon and ultimately achieve the goals set by the Mayor 
and his Commissioners.
The [Department of Health Built Environment Director] 
I think did an amazing job … being a really, really com-
mitted and passionate person … to take it from an idea 
and good will and to create something … an enabling 
context if you will. (Academic 3, ex-DOHMH)
Building and sustaining innovative 
“coalitions of the Willing”
The importance of cross-agency collaboration was highlighted 
by many participants, especially in the formulation of the Active 
Design Guidelines. While the issue of obesity and the ways of 
getting to a solution was contested in the beginning, there were 
several strands of work where strong and lasting relationships 
and a willingness to understand others’ strengths and points of 
view flourished. Partnerships formed around common and often 
highly innovative ideas which came from within the DOHMH, 
other Departments, and from non-government sources including 
academia, civil society, and private industry. Importantly, and not 
surprisingly in such a contentious space, these “coalitions of the 
willing” were often matched and in some cases overwhelmed by 
“coalitions of the unwilling.” This was particularly prominent in 
relation to work in the broader food environment.
The complexity of the issue and the need for solutions to be 
implemented across many different sectors creates challenges 
when working to address obesity, and New York City was not 
immune to these challenges, particularly at the start of the work:
 … there wasn’t a cohesive coalition within the obesity 
agenda across the entire city. It was a very fragmented, 
multi-voiced and with disparate voices speaking all 
of the same end goal but not with the same policy or 
program ideas … it made the waters muddy … I think 
having a very cohesive coalition with a clear agenda 
could have probably helped. (NYC Gov., Health 4)
In fact, most participants agreed that the obesity preven-
tion agenda for most of the Bloomberg period relied upon a 
loose coalition of largely un-connected groups within the City 
Government who had aligned agendas. These agendas included 
such diverse themes as: make New York City a better or more 
interesting place to live, work, move or eat; get the cars off the 
road through promotion of active travel options; sustain parks by 
diversifying and increasing their utility; and make streets safer 
and more user-friendly by reducing traffic and crime.
Active design was a great example … where all the agen-
cies came together and all of them contributed and all of 
them took a stake in it. (Private sector)
In this scenario, multiple leaders were able to appreciate the 
health cobenefits which their proposals could bring, and to use 
those cobenefits to strengthen their collective arguments for 
funding, legislative reform, and community support and in some 
cases to engage in coproduction. The Health Department played 
a key role in being enthusiastic and vocal supporters of some 
reforms, helping to determine and publicize the health benefits 
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rather than being the fundamental driver for some of these major 
reforms to the physical environment in the City. For example:
 … most of what the Department of Transport did, they did 
on their own but I could say we [DOHMH] acted as cheer-
leaders. We went to them to say “yes, this is not just [good] 
for transportation but also good for health”. (Academic 2)
Outside of the health sector, there were different motivations 
but many recognized the cobenefits, or had a very sophisticated 
understanding of the social and environmental determinants of 
health and their ability to influence this within their own disci-
pline. This was particularly the case among participants who were 
key leaders in the active design initiatives. For some, this was a 
very obvious alignment of objectives.
 … when we started working on this active design work, 
as a group of designers, we were looking at it thinking, 
well, this is really not anything revolutionary, this is just 
basically good and responsible design, this is fundamen-
tally what people should be doing anyway in designing 
and shaping their cities. (NYC Gov., non-health 1)
We saw a really great alignment with adding this new 
lens to talk about quality design that would have all 
these kinds of incredible public health benefits. (NYC 
Gov., non-health 1)
For others, the collaborative approach which brought together 
enthusiastic partners from such diverse disciplines was an inno-
vative if not unique approach which led to new and effective ways 
of achieving these common aims.
I think it’s pretty rare … in … city governments around 
the world to have that kind of intensive collaboration 
on a project. We couldn’t have produced [the award-
winning Active Design Guidelines] without the health 
evidence of our health colleagues. As health profes-
sionals they can provide the evidence and point to what 
the issues are but they do not necessarily know what the 
strategies are to help solve that … and that’s where the 
critical collaboration with design professionals comes 
in. (NYC Gov., non-health 1)
Most participants recalled a strong motivation to work 
through and address these challenges due to a commitment to 
the cause, a common interest in innovation, as well as a sense that 
what was being attempted was new and bold. Characteristics of 
this process included:
 …  that was part of the ‘stickiness’ … we felt that we 
were making something brand new … that was really 
important. (NYC Gov., non-health 2)
 … a level of determination and a level of willingness to 
listen and adapt and understand different perspectives. 
(NYC Gov., non-health 1)
For the majority of the work, and particularly in the food 
environment reforms, participants described DOHMH as having 
led because they had the political permission to do something, 
and the data to support the agreed approach. However, Health 
Staff also recognized that the practical expertise to actually design 
and then implement the key population level reforms lay in other 
Departments and that they alone could not achieve the grand 
Mayoral vision of achieving a healthier city.
… [The Active Design work was] a really great example 
of cross-agency collaboration. Although there was a 
health outcome we were really concerned about, it was 
really the bread-and-butter work of some of the other 
agencies … We had really good people in those agen-
cies who really agreed with us and really appreciated 
the convening, facilitating and supportive work of the 
[Health] Department. (Academic 3)
These reforms were recognized by participants as key contribu-
tions to creating an environment to support obesity prevention. 
Several participants described the Mayor’s encouragement of and 
investment in the revitalization and diversification of community 
open spaces and facilities throughout the city. He also encouraged 
the concept of “integrated streets,” which did not only concentrate 
on motor vehicle traffic.
So if you change that …  little things: you’re moving 
people, not just cars, you include bikes, pedestrians and 
cars, right? … [the Department of Transport] also has 
lots of real estate so part of [the] job is … making spaces 
for people to linger in as well as walk or ride through. 
It isn’t just about mobility. (NYC Gov., non-health 3)
Opponents to some of the initiatives that Bloomberg imple-
mented, or attempted to implement, however were described 
as persistent, persuasive, well-funded and well organized, and 
sometimes came from unanticipated directions.
The food industry, that’s soda companies, restaurants, 
grocery stores, bodegas, each have their own lobby 
group and are organized. Those [organizations] are 
mainly created by soda companies  …  the portion 
capping created one called New Yorkers for Beverage 
Choices, the tax one New Yorkers Against Food Taxes 
or something like that. They were completely transpar-
ent that they were front organizations and they weren’t 
really hiding much but it just showed they didn’t want 
to put the American Beverage Association or food 
companies name right up front. (Academic 2)
It’s incredible how much money the beverage industry 
can mobilize around the marketing of soda. We in pub-
lic health have our little budgets [for social marketing], 
in the neighborhood of tens of thousands of dollars. The 
beverage industry, on the other hand, spent like $7 mil-
lion in advertising in a couple of months … they had focus 
groups, they put together some really great materials. 
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So there was big opposition. The marketing and media 
they can pay for takes up a lot of landscape … to shape 
people’s opinion. (NYC Gov., Health 5)
However, in the case of reforms to the food environment, all 
news appeared to be seen as good news, as this extensive public 
debate raised awareness throughout the community to an extent 
which is difficult to imagine standard social marketing alone 
could have achieved. A key example mentioned by several par-
ticipants was the SSB portion cap proposal.
 … even the soda cap, we did not think it would be that 
shocking … you know, it was a bull’s-eye that we didn’t 
expect, including television shows talking about it and 
people doing scenes about it [in sit-coms]. (NYC Gov., 
Health 3)
Not all agreed with the approach, and this again was a perceived 
deficiency of the Bloomberg administration – the lack of interest, 
willingness or ability to create strong, sustained and widespread 
community support for some of the more controversial proposals.
I think the most telling critique of Bloomberg is that 
he didn’t try to build support for obesity control in 
New York’s poor communities and so it was possible 
for the food industry to characterize it as ‘nanny state’ 
work and as condescending and top down and it was 
possible for then the industry to either neutralize or 
enlist community leaders from black and Latino com-
munities in opposing some of those Bloomberg initia-
tives … transformative changes in food policy and then 
obesity reduction will require community mobilization. 
(Academic 4)
Instead, in an effort to counter these negative voices, 
participants reported that the administration sought support 
from a strong “coalition of the willing”; those with an interest 
in obesity prevention outside of government  –  in civil society, 
in academia, in the media, and the political sphere – who were 
willing to stand up and support the proposals from the Mayor, his 
Commissioners and from the City Government. Consequently 
they actively sought to:
 … build collaborations with the university and with the 
New York City academic community to do something 
both from the knowledge side and also from the action 
side. (Academic 5)
 … you have to have other people because it is much 
more credible honestly to have other people doing 
it … ideally, we would have 40 scientists and nutritional 
leaders and other people standing behind us [for an 
announcement]. (NYC Gov., Health 1)
There was recognition both within the Health Department 
and outside of the need for such vocal coalitions to sup-
port the initiative and the crucial role of non-health and 
non-government actors, including academics, in confirming 
the facts and supporting the initiatives, and making state-
ments in the public arena which were difficult or impossible 
for public officials.
 …  ground softening, making people aware …  high-
lighting the problem and ‘oh here is a really bold 
solution that nobody has ever done before but this is 
why it is important to do [it]’ … you have to have other 
people telling [this story] because it is much more cred-
ible … (NYC Gov., Health 1)
Later on in the process I learned how much influence, 
in terms of donations and money is involved from the 
industry and that kind of strengthened my thought that 
we have to voice our support a little stronger than we 
were typically comfortable with, just because the other 
side is so strong, based on very thin data. (Academic 5)
Similarly, civil society groups, other political actors outside 
of the City structure and even the private sector had their 
role as voices in favor of some of the reforms. In the relatively 
socio-economically disadvantaged Bronx Borough, for example, 
there were locally adapted programs especially in the nutrition 
environment where both the Borough President (an elected 
position with local leadership, advocacy and ceremonial powers) 
and a New York State Senator representing a Bronx district were 
prominent champions.
Throughout the City bureaucracy and in many non-
government and academic circles, there was a willingness to be 
involved. This translated to a sense that anything was possible, 
that bold and innovative ideas were welcome, and that collabora-
tive solutions were preferred. Within the Health Department in 
particular, this was a strong and consistent message, which came 
from the very top.
 … our Mayor who was a big supporter of public health 
issues, the Commissioner that cared about it, Federal 
funding [was received] to do more about it, was like 
‘the golden era’ of alignments … that made it possible 
to get …  innovative things on the table. (NYC Gov., 
Health 4)
Participants were driven by a passion to change New York 
City into a health promoting setting and many expressed pride 
in their world-leading work. Ultimately who took the credit and 
how this was achieved seemed less important to the participants 
than getting the job done.
Does it matter? I mean it’s sort of like religion. Does it 
matter your motivation as long as you get there? … if 
it’s a good thing, it’s all different paths to the same end. 
(NYC Gov., non-health 3)
a supportive context to achieve success
In addition to a strong authorizing environment, collabora-
tion across and outside the New York City government and a 
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willingness to explore innovative solutions, all participants agreed 
that this ambitious reform agenda had a supportive environment 
that enabled it to flourish. Elements of this supportive context 
included: a willingness to use non-legislative regulatory powers 
such as the Board of Health and Mayoral Executive Orders; 
federal government funding for specific projects; the ability to 
collect, analyze, and report on health and other data; the capacity 
to plan and execute communications strategies; and dedicated 
legal support.
Many of the reforms, which were proposed in New York 
City during this period relied on the use of the non-legislative, 
regulatory powers available to the administration (see Table 1). 
The Board of Health provided a mechanism whereby regulations 
could be proposed and then debated by health experts in a public 
forum. This route was particularly prominent in relation to the 
reforms to the food environment.
So the fact that New York has this Board of Health 
with that capacity [to change laws separate from the 
City Council] … that changes the scope for a leader [in 
public health]. (Academic 6)
Another crucial influence was Federal Government and 
other external including philanthropic funding which not only 
compensated for City budget cuts caused by the Global Financial 
Crisis, but also focused activity because of the need to report on 
targets related to specific programs. This was particularly the 
case in the physical activity environment work where funding 
supported inter-sectoral engagement, coalition building, confer-
ences, and training.
Well you know it [the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention grant] was certainly a big bolus of money 
but one has to appreciate at the same time there was a 
huge amount of local cuts. (Academic 3)
He [Mayor Bloomberg] even funded a lot of it through 
his … family money. (Academic 8)
Early in this period, and again influenced by Mayor 
Bloomberg’s background and interest in data, the importance of 
proving the effectiveness of the Health Department-led interven-
tions was recognized and funded. Through this, the scope of data 
collection, analysis, and reporting was significantly strengthened. 
As one interviewee remarked:
In God we trust, all others bring data. (Academic 2)
 … tracking numbers was a central part of our religion 
in the Health Department … we were driven by num-
bers … [the other agencies were] much less data driven 
and their numbers were much more likely the process 
numbers. (Academic 2)
While solid data to support the need for action as well as 
the likely effectiveness of proposed approaches was important, 
there was a recognition that communicating these was a crucial 
component to success and that communication planning there-
fore needed to be integral from the beginning. Despite the pre-
eminence of quantitative data, there was a recognition that stories 
are also important to counter negative perceptions.
It’s true that most politicians are driven by stories rather 
than data and we recognized that and tried to use the 
power of anecdote when we could … that wasn’t natural 
for me, so you know, the anecdote wars, we probably 
lost, but we won on the data wars! (Academic 2)
Similarly, many legal barriers or challenges were anticipated 
for some initiatives and internal legal counsel in the DOH was 
also involved from the very early planning stages.
Here we had a different sort of lawyer … who actually 
wanted to do policies and they were helpful rather 
than just coming in to say “don’t do it” because it’s too 
risky … when [the Health Commissioner] says “I want 
to do X”, [DOHMH legal counsel’s] job is not to say “no” 
but to tell me how to do X. (Academic 2)
As a result of this approach, there were many examples of 
reforms, which were successfullly introduced and sustained (such 
as the ban on trans fats, mandatory calorie labeling and the green 
cart expansion to areas of social and economic disadvantage), as 
well as some well-publicized failures (such as the aforementioned 
SSB portion cap proposal).
[DOHMH legal counsel] didn’t call it right every time, 
but we did a lot more than we would have done if it 
weren’t for [DOHMH legal counsel]. (Academic 2)
The method in which reform was achieved was often mutli-
layered, and a range of ways of getting things done was explored, 
with some of these unique to the New York City context.
Obesity is obviously a multi-level disease but we therefore 
couldn’t think that things were going to change in obesity 
because of one or two strategies, so that idea of layering 
has become very important for me to begin to shift [the] 
social norm … for instance, sugar-sweetened beverages 
we looked to change things like that in a whole myriad 
of ways: … in early childcare centers, that was through 
the Health Code. We had a Mayoral executive [order] to 
change food standards for all city agencies … and that 
included no sugar-sweetened beverages …  the Health 
Code [enforced] no sugar-sweetened beverages in day 
camps. (NYC Gov., Health 3)
The Health Department often laid the groundwork in gather-
ing the evidence, stating the case for action and working collabo-
ratively across government, and then Bloomberg acted using 
the powers available to him.
A big prelude to the executive order [to routinely 
integrate the use of the Active Design Guidelines on 
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all city construction and design projects] was Health 
working individually with each of the city agencies 
to see what was feasible within their agencies. (NYC 
Gov., Health 6)
Within the City Government, while there were many 
examples of enthusiastic cooperation and collaboration, 
sometimes there was a need for strong governance to over-
come the inertia that is inherent in any large bureaucracy. 
This lack of focus was not so much due to institutional 
reluctance but rather the presence of multiple competing 
priorities. In these circumstances, traction was created by the 
executive arm of government through the reinforcement of 
Mayoral priorities and at times by utilizing an event such as 
the release of a report to create opportunities to collaborate. 
However, at times, … the most effective tactic was bludgeoning 
persistence (academic 7, ex-Mayoral office).
Formal functional alignment of the City Government to 
address obesity, such as the New York City Obesity Taskforce (42) 
and other specific changes in governance structures occurred 
relatively late in the Bloomberg Administration. While some 
participants suggested that this was an attempt to widen the 
participation in reform, others saw this as a consolidation and an 
attempt to ensure sustainability.
Notwithstanding this concentrated effort, planning and 
innovative approaches and ideas, and all of the support which 
was available, including political support, many of the reforms 
did not succeed for a variety of reasons (see Table 1). However, 
several participants opined that the Bloomberg administration 
was highly successful in changing the conversation about obesity 
prevention at the population level.
 …  the conversation that occurs because of what 
we’ve done … and when you do something contro-
versial …  you get a huge conversation …  [which] 
begins to infiltrate the social norm. (NYC Gov., 
Health 3)
 … but then what happens is it starts getting into the 
vocabulary … if you say it enough and you keep doing 
it, it becomes …  part of the vocabulary (NYC Gov., 
non-health 3)
Ultimately, it seems participants believed that success is best 
defined in terms of changing the cultural norm:
Healthy communities …  that fundamentally is about 
norm change [which is] both cultural and policy ori-
ented … ground-up individual, community and family 
leadership and … policies and programs that support 
and cultivate that. (Politician)
DiscUssiOn
The crucial components of the ways in which a multi-agency 
complex intervention to address obesity in New York City was 
implemented during the Bloomberg administration, as perceived 
by central actors in the reforms, have been described. These can 
be summarized as the authority to act and leadership in acting, 
a commitment to collaborate and innovate and supportive struc-
tures to allow these to be enacted. This study is able to add a more 
complete picture than previous accounts due to: the time at which 
the study took place; the involvement of external researchers; and 
the extensive use of empirical data from a wide range of partici-
pants, triangulated with other published and electronic sources.
Kingdon’s three streams of problems, politics, and policies 
were clearly evident in the approach to obesity prevention in 
New York City during the Bloomberg administration (38). A 
problem, in this case rising rates of obesity and related chronic 
diseases, was recognized and brought to prominence resulting 
in a high degree of political support for doing something about 
this problem and a range of policy solutions were formulated, 
initiated, and sustained by “policy entrepreneurs” over a 12 year 
“window of opportunity” (4, 25, 31, 33, 34, 37).
In contrast to Kingdon’s theory, rather than pre-existing policy 
options being made available to match the political will to act, 
wide-ranging policies were developed by technical experts in the 
bureaucracy across the lifetime of the administration (25, 35, 36). 
To accomplish this task, two contrasting approaches emerged. In 
the food environment, policies were primarily and often relatively 
rapidly developed within the DOHMH utilizing the considerable 
regulatory powers available to that Department. In the physical 
activity environment, reforms were more likely to emerge either 
from outside the DOHMH or with a more deliberate and highly 
collaborative approach.
Moore’s strategic triangle is also relevant to explain the 
strengths and the weaknesses of the Bloomberg approach to 
obesity prevention (39, 40). Authority was clearly and consist-
ently given from the mayor, but there were constant difficulties in 
other components of this crucial source of legitimacy to act – the 
city council, the courts of law, and the “court” of public opinion 
including the commercial sector. Operational capacity was clearly 
enhanced through deliberate decisions on the re-direction of 
internal funding and resources within health, the requirements 
to fulfill certain criteria of external funding sources, and in par-
ticular the innovative collaborations, which flourished across the 
City Government and with the non-government sector. Moore’s 
concepts of coproduction to achieve cobenefit was clearly evident 
in the Active Design Guidelines and related physical environmen-
tal reforms but less so in the reforms to the food environment. 
The one area in which the Bloomberg administration probably 
and crucially failed was in consistently building the public value 
proposition for the reform agenda.
A key question remains: what is unique to New York City 
and/or the Bloomberg administration and what is generalizable 
to other contexts? New York City, with a population of over 
8.4 million people, is more populated than 39 of the 50 United 
States. While this does create challenges of scale and diversity, the 
substantially larger resource base and an innovative, well-trained 
workforce provides considerable comparative advantages over 
other cities in the US and elsewhere (43). So, while it is indeed 
feasible for health departments elsewhere to decide to employ 
lawyers, epidemiologists and communication specialists with 
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specific tasks in obesity prevention initiatives, New York City has 
extensive resources with a consequent ability to carry out these 
vital supportive tasks in ways which may be beyond the capacity 
of smaller jurisdictions (4, 43). During the Bloomberg era, the 
City made the decision to allocate such resources to the task of 
addressing obesity.
The role of leadership
The key attributes of public sector leadership have been extensively 
debated. This is particularly crucial when a government commits 
to tackling so called “wicked problems” like obesity where the 
issue, its underlying determinants, and the potential solutions are 
complex and sometimes contested (44, 45). In its simplest form, 
the role of a leader is to frame a vision and then inspire, enable, 
and empower others to pursue it (46). This is easily written but 
very difficult to consistently and sustainably put into practice in 
real world settings, particularly in the face of strong opposition 
from vested interests (2, 47).
This study confirms that Bloomberg possessed rather unique 
attributes for an elected official. These included a perceived lack of 
further political ambition beyond the New York City Mayoralty, 
non-reliance on campaign funding from external sources, a 
sustained interest in public health, and an appreciation of the 
pre-eminence of data to support decision making. The longevity 
of Bloomberg’s tenure and the stability, ability, and undoubted 
resolve of his Health and other Commissioners, as well as 
their directors and staff, was similarly unusual. Together, these 
elements of the administration allowed for a long-term view, a 
sustained focus, innovative solutions, and a systematic approach.
This strong, consistent, and prolonged political support for 
public health action was a feature of the Bloomberg period (36). 
The mayor provided a stable authorizing environment and stood 
by decisions, despite sustained campaigns against some of his 
initiatives via well-funded and highly visible campaigns by various 
business interests (e.g., sugar taxes, SSB portion cap), civil society 
(e.g., the schools and green carts), and in the media (42, 48, 49). 
An example was his continued support for controversial changes to 
motor vehicle access to Times Square during one of his re-election 
campaigns. He has been quoted as saying:
I don’t ask my Commissioners to do the right thing 
according to the political calendar. I ask them to 
do the right thing  –  period. (As quoted by former 
Department of Transport Commissioner Jeanette 
Sadik-Khan) (50)
However, as has been demonstrated in this paper, this politi-
cal commitment at the highest level of government was not the 
only example of leadership during this public health “golden era” 
in New York City. Bloomberg appointed skilled and respected 
Commissioners who hired talented staff and they in turn were 
crucial in bringing the issues and potential solutions to him as 
well as implementing them. At this level, there was evidence of 
transformational leadership across multiple sectors who were 
prepared to set short and long-term goals, collaborate outside of 
their own portfolios, and dedicate substantial resources to get the 
job done (37).
innovative solutions and approaches to  
a “Wicked” Problem
The breadth of reforms and the truly cross-agency nature of 
the obesity-prevention agenda in New York City during the 
Bloomberg period were impressive. In Kingdon’s terms, there 
were a number of “policy entrepreneurs” within the bureaucracy 
during this period who, encouraged by the Mayor’s interest in 
the health of his constituents, actively pursued innovative policies 
and innovative ways of achieving them. Moore’s framework pos-
its that the public sector manager should actively seek to improve 
the lives of the public which they serve by acting as a strategic 
decision maker with due regard to legitimacy, public value, and 
feasibility (40). This approach was similarly apparent during the 
Bloomberg administration (36).
There was an abundance of creativity to formulate new policies 
to influence the obesogenic environment at a population level 
(see Table 1). More importantly, there is strong evidence from 
this study that proves the existence of a governance system that 
allowed these ideas to be tested, and for data to be systematically 
collected and analyzed to further inform policy development. 
In essence, the Health Department did what they have called 
on others to do in understanding the context and successfully 
translating research into effective policy and programs (51). This 
is a well-recognized pre-requisite for successful implementation 
in the management literature (52). Examples included the use 
of simple signage to prompt stair-use (53, 54), and the various 
approaches used to foster changes in the food environment via 
commercial incentives such as FRESH, the green-cart initiatives, 
and calorie labeling (10, 15).
It was clear that one key enabling factor was the existence of 
the Health Code and the Board of Health. This non-legislative 
but regulatory function run by health experts is not unique 
to New York City (49). However, the innovative use of the 
Board of Health during this period, with a willingness to test 
the boundaries of the Board’s mandate in the prevention of 
chronic disease, was unique at the time. The trans fat ban and 
calorie labeling were successfully introduced through this 
mechanism, whereas the SSB portion cap was not. A key les-
son here, which is more generalizable to other settings, is the 
importance of understanding the governance structures that 
are available and to use whatever means are feasible to achieve 
the best outcome.
This relates very much to the feasibility component of Moore’s 
ideal public administrator (40). Various commentaries on the 
tenure of Bloomberg’s first Health Commissioner, as reported in 
this paper and elsewhere, have pointed to the central role of meas-
urement in policy discussions so as to prove that it was feasible to 
intervene, that intervention was likely to work and that this effect 
could be measured (35, 36).
A common view which was expressed by several participants 
in this study was that, as a major international city, New Yorkers 
perceive that they have a responsibility to lead the nation if not 
the world in multiple spheres. This resonated with Bloomberg’s 
view, shared by others across his administration, that attracting 
a dynamic, young, innovative demographic (50) was a key policy 
objective, in parallel with his agenda to increase life expectancy 
and tackle life-style related risk factors for chronic disease. 
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This holistic view created many opportunities for coproduction 
to achieve cobenefits across multiple portfolios.
A criticism remains, one shared by some of the participants 
in this study, that these meso-level reforms did not address the 
underlying determinants of poverty, employment, and education 
among others, particularly in disadvantaged communities within 
the city (2, 33). Instead, New York City concentrated on what 
Backholder and others (55) have termed “agento-structural” 
interventions, those which aim to influence the environment 
but also rely on some level of individual action, essentially those 
which assist to make the healthy choice the easier choice (1, 36, 
56). For example, the creation of open stairwells in the internal 
built environment and integrated streets in the wider physical 
environment provided opportunities for increased physical activ-
ity in the daily lives of New Yorkers, without mandating those 
choices. Similarly, in the food environment, calorie labeling was 
mandated to promote greater awareness, but food choice remains 
with the consumer.
Bloomberg has also been criticized, both by some partici-
pants in this study, and more widely in the public domain as 
being a “nanny,” that the reforms were all “top down” and 
that he concentrated on the “big end of town.” However, the 
motivations of detractors have been questioned (47, 48, 57, 58) 
and there is evidence of substantial community consultation 
with many of the public health initiatives. For example, the 
Department of Transport consulted widely on reforms, hold-
ing over 2,000 public meetings a year and even door-to-door 
consultations on local projects, for example bike lanes, bike-
share infrastructure and traffic calming device installations 
(50). Similarly, the non-targeted nature of many of the policies 
and programs resulted in changes throughout the city, with 
arguably a greater public health benefit in low socio-economic 
neighborhoods (48).
collaborating inside and Outside of 
government
As has been confirmed in this study, the formation and sustaining 
of a wide-reaching “coalition of the willing” to support reform 
as well as developing strategies to deal with well-organized and 
vocal “coalitions of the un-willing” were prominent elements of 
the Bloomberg administration’s obesity prevention agenda. The 
strength and breadth of these coalitions varied over time and 
according to the particular component of the proposed reforms. 
Coalitions were within government and between government 
and various non-government actors and organizations. They 
were both formal, most notably in the physical environmental 
reforms and in particular in the work, which led to the formula-
tion of the Active Design Guidelines, and informal, such as those 
related to the portion cap reforms where the academic sector were 
important allies and supporters.
Another important concept in coalition building, to which 
both Kingdon and Moore subscribe, is the role of coproduction to 
achieve cobenefits. In other words, collaborating to attain mutually 
satisfactory but sometimes widely dissimilar endpoints (25, 38, 59).
It has been suggested that coalitions of support are crucial 
to ensure implementation and sustainability of public health 
policies (59). Building and maintaining coalitions can be frus-
tratingly time consuming, costly, and can be easily de-railed by 
a noisy counter-movement. In addition, coalitions of diverse 
sectors can lead to a “lowest common denominator” approach 
rather than what health experts may agree is best-practice 
(59, 60). One approach is to create a “neutral zone” to allow 
collaboration. In other words, to agree what can be agreed and 
work with that, while leaving contentious issues to one side, 
at least initially (59). As has been documented in this study, 
while compromise did occur, this was not a prominent aspect of 
obesity prevention during the Bloomberg administration where 
multiple novel and sometimes controversial reforms were pur-
sued in parallel. The central role of “change agents,” Kingdon’s 
“policy entrepreneurs,” has been highlighted by others (59) and 
this role was particularly prominent in the writers of the Active 
Design Guidelines in New York City, both across government 
and outside government (26).
“coalitions of the Unwilling”
In New York City, during the Bloomberg administration, several 
of the most innovative and potentially effective reforms were 
blocked. Some of the organized opposition to reform appeared 
to be genuine concern by often quite local and spontaneously 
formed groups. However, much of the opposition to reform of 
the food environment was led, either overtly or covertly, by com-
mercial interests. These groups were therefore not truly “grass-
roots” organizations arising from the community themselves, 
but rather “false grassroots” or “Astroturf ” organizations being 
organized by external forces (36). This has strong echoes of the 
role of “big tobacco” in resisting smoking reform (2) and can be 
subtle (47) or blatant (8, 49, 57). Yanamadala and others (61) have 
shown that a high proportion of “community groups” opposed 
to food environment reform are actually funded by “big sugar,” 
that is, organizations with vested economic interests in the sugar 
industry (62).
The food stamp restriction failed because it relied on Federal 
agreement, which was withdrawn following pressure from 
advocacy groups including the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and anti-hunger organizations 
(63). The sugar tax relied on agreement by the State legislature 
and was twice rejected after a concerted advocacy campaign by 
The American Beverage Association (ABA, the peak industry 
body for soda manufacturers), an Astroturf organization known 
as New Yorkers Against Unfair Taxes, various libertarian groups, 
and a former President of the American Dietetic Association 
(6, 34). The SSB portion cap proposal was vehemently opposed 
by industry groups (including New Yorkers for Beverage Choice 
which was initially funded by the ABA) (7).
Partly because of this well-organized opposition, nutrition 
reforms were the subject of extensive discussion before being 
enacted, and this often led to modifications. For example, the 
Board of Health received 38,000 written submissions (84% in 
favor) and a 90,530-signature petition in opposition, sponsored 
by the ABA. The regulation was passed by the Board of Health 
but was never enacted because of a legal challenge, again led by 
the ABA (7, 36).
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Interestingly, the court decision to overturn the Board’s regu-
lation, which was upheld on appeal, emphasized the principle of 
the separation of powers (arguing that the Board of Health can 
implement reforms but the City Council should lead on policy), 
and industrial fairness (not all purveyors of SSBs were affected 
equally) rather than any ruling related to undue government 
interference on personal freedom to choose (21).
contrasting approaches to Food and 
Physical environment reforms
This study has described the two divergent paths taken in the obe-
sity prevention agenda in New York City during the Bloomberg 
administration. In general, the nutrition reforms were more direct 
and top down. For many of the nutrition reforms, the “window 
of opportunity” was perceived to be short, there were potential 
mechanisms to enact reform via the Board of Health and so 
the Health Department essentially worked quickly and alone. 
Unfortunately, although causality cannot be directly attributed, 
the most contentious and most widely known of the reforms such 
as the soda cap and sugar tax proposals were unable to be sus-
tained (see Table 1). This was in stark contrast to the active design 
work, which was described by participants as being characterized 
by a very collaborative approach across multiple city departments 
and the partners they engaged, with key coordination support 
from the Health Department. This appears to have resulted in 
much slower, incremental progress particularly in changes to 
the internal built environment, which was felt would be more 
sustainable in the long term. What is not clear is whether the 
success or lack thereof was due to the approach or the elements 
being addressed.
Contestability of how the problem is defined and what solu-
tions were acceptable appears to be almost inevitable in nutri-
tional reform to combat obesity (4, 49, 64). On the other hand, 
the existence of cobenefits to engender and sustain coalitions 
is clearer in active design. In the external environment, rede-
signed open spaces, with easy non-motorized vehicular access 
routes and adequate lighting increases the vibrancy of city life, 
decreases crime, increases social connectivity, decreases road 
traffic congestion and air pollution while increasing physical 
activity with a positive health benefit (25, 33). Similarly, facili-
tating the use of stairs rather than elevators and escalators in 
multi-story buildings can enhance environmental sustainability 
while increasing physical activity with health and productivity 
benefits (1, 13, 25).
The ultimately failed reforms in the nutritional environment 
(SSB portion cap, sugar taxes, food stamp restrictions) may 
have been due to a lack of consultation, but equally may have 
been due to the coordinated opposition of those who perceived 
these as threatening to their commercial interests. On the other 
hand, the sustained success of the active design agenda could be 
due to the highly collaborative and relatively slow-moving and 
iterative approach, but equally could be because there was strong 
consensus that what was being proposed had strong cobenefits 
to multiple sectors, and that what was being promoted as healthy 
design was really a subset or an extension of the predominant dis-
course in urban design, namely the building of attractive, usable, 
and sustainable urban environments on a human scale (25, 65).
It should be noted, however, that not all food-related initia-
tives resulted in conflict and opposition from the food indus-
try. The Food Retail Expansion to Support Health (FRESH) 
Program was based on the creation of tax and zoning incentives 
for supermarket creation and expansion in underserved neigh-
borhoods lacking in healthy food access. FRESH was created 
and implemented under the leadership of the Mayor’s Office 
working with City Planning, Economic Development, and the 
Health Department’s Built Environment Director who was also 
responsible for the active design work. The Program followed 
a similar trajectory to the active design work with strong sup-
port across multiple city departments and stakeholders and 
with a strong emphasis on the health and economic cobenefits 
of the initiative for the city, underserved populations, and 
supermarket operators. The FRESH Program, however, was 
not a regulatory food initiative but one based on the creation 
of incentives (10, 15, 25).
The Bloomberg legacy and lessons 
learnt
Much of the work of the Bloomberg administration remains in 
place under a new Mayor and some of the proposed reforms, for 
example in the building codes to encourage stair use, have now 
been enacted by the City Council. Despite the failure to influence 
SSB consumption through legislative means, there has been a sta-
tistically significant decrease in SSB consumption in both adults 
and children (64). This has led to participants feeling that, despite 
all the challenges, the work in this arena was worthwhile as it 
changed the conversation and social norms. There is furthermore 
emerging evidence of a stabilization and initial reversal of obesity 
rates in New York City’s children (64).
In addition, many of the Bloomberg reforms are being repli-
cated and even expanded successfully in other settings. Trans-
unsaturated fats have been banned nationally in the US, and this 
measure is also being considered elsewhere (66). Calorie labeling 
has been included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act in 2010 (32, 67), alongside nutritional standards for children’s 
meals (68) and sugar taxes in Mexico and Berkeley, CA, USA (64). 
Active design principles are being adopted in multiple countries 
across several continents, with over 40 cities globally having 
worked with and/or working with the former New York City 
Health Department Built Environment Director as an advisor on 
obesity and chronic disease prevention issues (37).
limitations
This paper reports on a case study based on interviews of those 
who were involved in the obesity prevention reforms of the 
Bloomberg Administration, and therefore have a particular view 
of the events described here. The inclusion of outsiders with likely 
divergent views was out of scope of this study. Participants did, 
however, represent a wide range of perspectives, with those who 
work outside of DOHMH being well represented. The sample 
mainly included executive level staff and therefore decision 
makers and leaders rather than implementers. Not all of the key 
decision makers or early implementers were included in the list of 
participants. To address this limitation, analysis of peer reviewed 
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publications by some of these individuals (4, 5), a recording of 
a public policy seminar (42), as well as key public interviews 
(50) was undertaken and analyzed in addition to the interview 
material.
cOnclUsiOn
During the Bloomberg administration, the New York City 
Government may not have always got things right, but they had 
the permission and the dedication to attempt something bold and 
new, and there is much which can be learnt from their experi-
ences. Some successes, such as the reversal of childhood obesity 
trends and SSB consumption did occur.
Multi-sectoral, multi-strategy approaches are generally 
recommended to address a wicked problem such as obesity. 
However, implementation of this method within existing govern-
ance structures in most settings is difficult. This period in New 
York City illustrates what can be achieved when there is sustained 
political will to act on the evidence-based advice of technical 
experts, even in the face of strong commercial and community 
opposition. Rather than rigid cross-agency structures, which are 
commonly formed to tackle wicked problems, the Bloomberg 
approach which consisted of a variety of multi-sectoral partner-
ships performing specific projects of work offers an alternative 
approach. This may be as simple as adding a health narrative to 
non-health interventions, which could be beneficial to obesity 
prevention, such as regulatory reforms or infrastructure to sup-
port active lifestyles.
Kingdon’s three streams theory (politics, problems, and policy) 
and Moore’s strategic triangle (authority, value and capacity) are 
useful in understanding how obesity prevention policy and prac-
tice operated in New York City during the Bloomberg administra-
tion. This period certainly represented a window of opportunity, 
and Bloomberg and others were undoubtedly policy entrepre-
neurs. The public value proposition of improving the health of 
New Yorkers was clearly articulated by politicians and within the 
bureaucracy and there was a concerted effort to increase capacity 
to act. However, the public value for individual reforms was highly 
contested in the public discourse, albeit with strong influence 
from the commercial sector. The failure to gain public support for 
many of the reforms could be seen as the most important limiter 
to the sustainability of the reforms of the Bloomberg period.
However, theoretical models have their limitations. What is 
clear from this study is the importance of the persistence and 
adaptability of public health practitioners who are tasked with 
applying theoretical frameworks and limited evidence of the 
effectiveness of interventions, often with scanty details on 
implementation, at the whole-population level. At the munici-
pal level of government in particular, there are the additional 
challenges of often rapidly changing, complex circumstances at 
the interface between interventions and the conflicted views of 
multiple stakeholders.
The Bloomberg “golden era” for public health reform is 
remarkable due to the sustained effort and the multiplicity of 
interventions, in particular the willingness to work within the 
regulatory space. It remains to be seen if it is reproducible in other 
places and at other times and so there remains a need for further 
analytical research of similar and dissimilar governance models 
in different contexts.
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